An Oblivious Game: Theoretic Approach for Wireless Scheduling in V2V Communications

Xianfu Chen, Celimuge Wu, Mehdi Bennis

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference article in proceedingsScientificpeer-review

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper addresses the problem of wireless resource scheduling in a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication network. The technical challenges lie in the fast changing network dynamics, namely, the channel quality and the data traffic variations. For a road segment covered by a road side unit (RSU), especially in a dense urban area, the vehicle density tends to be stable. The incoming service requests from the vehicle user equipment (VUE)-pairs compete with each other for the limited frequency resource in order to deliver data packets. Such competitions are regulated by the RSU via a sealed second-price auction at the beginning of scheduling slots. Each incumbent service request aims at maximizing the expected long-term payoff from bidding the frequency resource for packet transmissions. Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) can be utilized to characterize the optimal competitive behaviors of the service requests. When the number of incumbent VUE-pairs becomes large, solving the MPE becomes infeasible. We adopt an oblivious equilibrium to approximate the MPE, which is theoretically proven to be error-bounded. The decision making process at each service request is hence transformed into a single-agent Markov decision process, for which we propose an on-line auction based learning scheme. Through simulation experiments, we show the potential performance gains from our proposed scheme, in terms of per-service request average utility.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publication2017 IEEE Global Communications Conference GLOBECOM 2017
    PublisherIEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
    Pages1-6
    Number of pages6
    ISBN (Electronic)978-1-5090-5019-2
    ISBN (Print)978-1-5090-5020-8
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 10 Jan 2018
    MoE publication typeA4 Article in a conference publication
    EventIEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2017 - Singapore, Singapore
    Duration: 4 Dec 20178 Dec 2017

    Conference

    ConferenceIEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2017
    CountrySingapore
    CitySingapore
    Period4/12/178/12/17

    Fingerprint

    Scheduling
    Communication
    Vehicle to vehicle communications
    Telecommunication networks
    Decision making
    Experiments

    Cite this

    Chen, X., Wu, C., & Bennis, M. (2018). An Oblivious Game: Theoretic Approach for Wireless Scheduling in V2V Communications. In 2017 IEEE Global Communications Conference GLOBECOM 2017 (pp. 1-6). IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers . https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2017.8254668
    Chen, Xianfu ; Wu, Celimuge ; Bennis, Mehdi. / An Oblivious Game : Theoretic Approach for Wireless Scheduling in V2V Communications. 2017 IEEE Global Communications Conference GLOBECOM 2017. IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers , 2018. pp. 1-6
    @inproceedings{8772f4f282024c7ab80368326ad1e6fa,
    title = "An Oblivious Game: Theoretic Approach for Wireless Scheduling in V2V Communications",
    abstract = "This paper addresses the problem of wireless resource scheduling in a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication network. The technical challenges lie in the fast changing network dynamics, namely, the channel quality and the data traffic variations. For a road segment covered by a road side unit (RSU), especially in a dense urban area, the vehicle density tends to be stable. The incoming service requests from the vehicle user equipment (VUE)-pairs compete with each other for the limited frequency resource in order to deliver data packets. Such competitions are regulated by the RSU via a sealed second-price auction at the beginning of scheduling slots. Each incumbent service request aims at maximizing the expected long-term payoff from bidding the frequency resource for packet transmissions. Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) can be utilized to characterize the optimal competitive behaviors of the service requests. When the number of incumbent VUE-pairs becomes large, solving the MPE becomes infeasible. We adopt an oblivious equilibrium to approximate the MPE, which is theoretically proven to be error-bounded. The decision making process at each service request is hence transformed into a single-agent Markov decision process, for which we propose an on-line auction based learning scheme. Through simulation experiments, we show the potential performance gains from our proposed scheme, in terms of per-service request average utility.",
    author = "Xianfu Chen and Celimuge Wu and Mehdi Bennis",
    year = "2018",
    month = "1",
    day = "10",
    doi = "10.1109/GLOCOM.2017.8254668",
    language = "English",
    isbn = "978-1-5090-5020-8",
    pages = "1--6",
    booktitle = "2017 IEEE Global Communications Conference GLOBECOM 2017",
    publisher = "IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers",
    address = "United States",

    }

    Chen, X, Wu, C & Bennis, M 2018, An Oblivious Game: Theoretic Approach for Wireless Scheduling in V2V Communications. in 2017 IEEE Global Communications Conference GLOBECOM 2017. IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers , pp. 1-6, IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2017, Singapore, Singapore, 4/12/17. https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2017.8254668

    An Oblivious Game : Theoretic Approach for Wireless Scheduling in V2V Communications. / Chen, Xianfu; Wu, Celimuge; Bennis, Mehdi.

    2017 IEEE Global Communications Conference GLOBECOM 2017. IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers , 2018. p. 1-6.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference article in proceedingsScientificpeer-review

    TY - GEN

    T1 - An Oblivious Game

    T2 - Theoretic Approach for Wireless Scheduling in V2V Communications

    AU - Chen, Xianfu

    AU - Wu, Celimuge

    AU - Bennis, Mehdi

    PY - 2018/1/10

    Y1 - 2018/1/10

    N2 - This paper addresses the problem of wireless resource scheduling in a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication network. The technical challenges lie in the fast changing network dynamics, namely, the channel quality and the data traffic variations. For a road segment covered by a road side unit (RSU), especially in a dense urban area, the vehicle density tends to be stable. The incoming service requests from the vehicle user equipment (VUE)-pairs compete with each other for the limited frequency resource in order to deliver data packets. Such competitions are regulated by the RSU via a sealed second-price auction at the beginning of scheduling slots. Each incumbent service request aims at maximizing the expected long-term payoff from bidding the frequency resource for packet transmissions. Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) can be utilized to characterize the optimal competitive behaviors of the service requests. When the number of incumbent VUE-pairs becomes large, solving the MPE becomes infeasible. We adopt an oblivious equilibrium to approximate the MPE, which is theoretically proven to be error-bounded. The decision making process at each service request is hence transformed into a single-agent Markov decision process, for which we propose an on-line auction based learning scheme. Through simulation experiments, we show the potential performance gains from our proposed scheme, in terms of per-service request average utility.

    AB - This paper addresses the problem of wireless resource scheduling in a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication network. The technical challenges lie in the fast changing network dynamics, namely, the channel quality and the data traffic variations. For a road segment covered by a road side unit (RSU), especially in a dense urban area, the vehicle density tends to be stable. The incoming service requests from the vehicle user equipment (VUE)-pairs compete with each other for the limited frequency resource in order to deliver data packets. Such competitions are regulated by the RSU via a sealed second-price auction at the beginning of scheduling slots. Each incumbent service request aims at maximizing the expected long-term payoff from bidding the frequency resource for packet transmissions. Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) can be utilized to characterize the optimal competitive behaviors of the service requests. When the number of incumbent VUE-pairs becomes large, solving the MPE becomes infeasible. We adopt an oblivious equilibrium to approximate the MPE, which is theoretically proven to be error-bounded. The decision making process at each service request is hence transformed into a single-agent Markov decision process, for which we propose an on-line auction based learning scheme. Through simulation experiments, we show the potential performance gains from our proposed scheme, in terms of per-service request average utility.

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85046354722&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1109/GLOCOM.2017.8254668

    DO - 10.1109/GLOCOM.2017.8254668

    M3 - Conference article in proceedings

    AN - SCOPUS:85046354722

    SN - 978-1-5090-5020-8

    SP - 1

    EP - 6

    BT - 2017 IEEE Global Communications Conference GLOBECOM 2017

    PB - IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers

    ER -

    Chen X, Wu C, Bennis M. An Oblivious Game: Theoretic Approach for Wireless Scheduling in V2V Communications. In 2017 IEEE Global Communications Conference GLOBECOM 2017. IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers . 2018. p. 1-6 https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2017.8254668