Abstract
Currently, no consensus approach is available for
assessing safety and reliability of digital I&C at
nuclear power plants. Due to the absence of a common
method for modelling software failures in the
probabilistic safety assessment, generic common cause
failure probabilities are usually used, which tend to be
conservative and may ultimately prevent PSA results from
providing proper risk insights. This paper presents a
method for the quantification of software failures in a
reactor protection system. The emphasis of the method is
in the definition of the relevant software fault cases
and related failure effects. The outlined quantification
method offers a practical and justifiable approach to
account for software failures.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 310-319 |
| Journal | International Journal of Nuclear Safety and Simulation |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 |
| MoE publication type | A1 Journal article-refereed |
Keywords
- software reliability
- probabilistic safety assessment
- reactor protection system
- nuclear safety