Analysis and modelling of software in probabilistic safety assessment

Jan-Erik Holmberg, Ola Bäckström, Tero Tyrväinen

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

    Abstract

    Currently, no consensus approach is available for assessing safety and reliability of digital I&C at nuclear power plants. Due to the absence of a common method for modelling software failures in the probabilistic safety assessment, generic common cause failure probabilities are usually used, which tend to be conservative and may ultimately prevent PSA results from providing proper risk insights. This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system. The emphasis of the method is in the definition of the relevant software fault cases and related failure effects. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)310-319
    JournalInternational Journal of Nuclear Safety and Simulation
    Volume5
    Issue number4
    Publication statusPublished - 2015
    MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

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    Nuclear power plants

    Keywords

    • software reliability
    • probabilistic safety assessment
    • reactor protection system
    • nuclear safety

    Cite this

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    title = "Analysis and modelling of software in probabilistic safety assessment",
    abstract = "Currently, no consensus approach is available for assessing safety and reliability of digital I&C at nuclear power plants. Due to the absence of a common method for modelling software failures in the probabilistic safety assessment, generic common cause failure probabilities are usually used, which tend to be conservative and may ultimately prevent PSA results from providing proper risk insights. This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system. The emphasis of the method is in the definition of the relevant software fault cases and related failure effects. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures.",
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    author = "Jan-Erik Holmberg and Ola B{\"a}ckstr{\"o}m and Tero Tyrv{\"a}inen",
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    Analysis and modelling of software in probabilistic safety assessment. / Holmberg, Jan-Erik; Bäckström, Ola; Tyrväinen, Tero.

    In: International Journal of Nuclear Safety and Simulation, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2015, p. 310-319.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Analysis and modelling of software in probabilistic safety assessment

    AU - Holmberg, Jan-Erik

    AU - Bäckström, Ola

    AU - Tyrväinen, Tero

    N1 - Project code: 85366

    PY - 2015

    Y1 - 2015

    N2 - Currently, no consensus approach is available for assessing safety and reliability of digital I&C at nuclear power plants. Due to the absence of a common method for modelling software failures in the probabilistic safety assessment, generic common cause failure probabilities are usually used, which tend to be conservative and may ultimately prevent PSA results from providing proper risk insights. This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system. The emphasis of the method is in the definition of the relevant software fault cases and related failure effects. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures.

    AB - Currently, no consensus approach is available for assessing safety and reliability of digital I&C at nuclear power plants. Due to the absence of a common method for modelling software failures in the probabilistic safety assessment, generic common cause failure probabilities are usually used, which tend to be conservative and may ultimately prevent PSA results from providing proper risk insights. This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system. The emphasis of the method is in the definition of the relevant software fault cases and related failure effects. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures.

    KW - software reliability

    KW - probabilistic safety assessment

    KW - reactor protection system

    KW - nuclear safety

    M3 - Article

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    EP - 319

    JO - International Journal of Nuclear Safety and Simulation

    JF - International Journal of Nuclear Safety and Simulation

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