Analysis and modelling of software in probabilistic safety assessment

Jan-Erik Holmberg, Ola Bäckström, Tero Tyrväinen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Currently, no consensus approach is available for assessing safety and reliability of digital I&C at nuclear power plants. Due to the absence of a common method for modelling software failures in the probabilistic safety assessment, generic common cause failure probabilities are usually used, which tend to be conservative and may ultimately prevent PSA results from providing proper risk insights. This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system. The emphasis of the method is in the definition of the relevant software fault cases and related failure effects. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)310-319
JournalInternational Journal of Nuclear Safety and Simulation
Volume5
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2015
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

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Nuclear power plants

Keywords

  • software reliability
  • probabilistic safety assessment
  • reactor protection system
  • nuclear safety

Cite this

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title = "Analysis and modelling of software in probabilistic safety assessment",
abstract = "Currently, no consensus approach is available for assessing safety and reliability of digital I&C at nuclear power plants. Due to the absence of a common method for modelling software failures in the probabilistic safety assessment, generic common cause failure probabilities are usually used, which tend to be conservative and may ultimately prevent PSA results from providing proper risk insights. This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system. The emphasis of the method is in the definition of the relevant software fault cases and related failure effects. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures.",
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Analysis and modelling of software in probabilistic safety assessment. / Holmberg, Jan-Erik; Bäckström, Ola; Tyrväinen, Tero.

In: International Journal of Nuclear Safety and Simulation, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2015, p. 310-319.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AU - Holmberg, Jan-Erik

AU - Bäckström, Ola

AU - Tyrväinen, Tero

N1 - Project code: 85366

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AB - Currently, no consensus approach is available for assessing safety and reliability of digital I&C at nuclear power plants. Due to the absence of a common method for modelling software failures in the probabilistic safety assessment, generic common cause failure probabilities are usually used, which tend to be conservative and may ultimately prevent PSA results from providing proper risk insights. This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system. The emphasis of the method is in the definition of the relevant software fault cases and related failure effects. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures.

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KW - probabilistic safety assessment

KW - reactor protection system

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JO - International Journal of Nuclear Safety and Simulation

JF - International Journal of Nuclear Safety and Simulation

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