Assessing safety of CAN-communications systems

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference article in proceedingsProfessional

    Abstract

    Controller Area Network (CAN) is a de-facto communications standard in many fields of machine automation. Such fields are example forestry machines and mining machines. In many cases the CAN-bus carries data that is safety relevant. However, the implementation of the CAN-bus does not often include a certified safety layer and is thus not characterised as a safety bus. The paper describes a procedure to assess non-certified CAN communications systems in regard to safety. The procedure is partly based on the message error model of the IEC 61784-3 standard for the functional safety of fieldbuses and partly on the validation methods defined in the Swedish Pålbus-project. The message error model consists, according to IEC 61784-3, of eight communication error types, corruption, unintended repetition, incorrect sequence, loss, unacceptable delay, insertion, masquerade and wrong addressing. Besides these, excessive transmission time jitter and inconsistency are additional error types, the latter being a special case of the eight error types above. Of these, corruption threat and unacceptable delay can be assessed quantitatively; for others qualitative analysis is adequate. A more precise assessment of corruption error compared to that of IEC 61784-3 is discussed in the paper.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationSIAS 2010
    Subtitle of host publicationThe 6th International Conference on Safety of Industrial Automated Systems, Tampere, 14.-15.6.2010
    Place of PublicationHelsinki
    Number of pages6
    Publication statusPublished - 2010
    MoE publication typeD3 Professional conference proceedings
    Event6th International Conference on Safety of Industrial Automation Systems, SIAS 2010 - Tampere, Finland
    Duration: 14 Jun 201015 Jun 2010
    Conference number: 6

    Conference

    Conference6th International Conference on Safety of Industrial Automation Systems, SIAS 2010
    Abbreviated titleSIAS 2010
    CountryFinland
    CityTampere
    Period14/06/1015/06/10

    Fingerprint

    Communication systems
    Controllers
    Communication
    Forestry
    Jitter
    Automation

    Keywords

    • machines
    • control system
    • safety
    • analysis

    Cite this

    Alanen, J. (2010). Assessing safety of CAN-communications systems. In SIAS 2010: The 6th International Conference on Safety of Industrial Automated Systems, Tampere, 14.-15.6.2010 Helsinki.
    Alanen, Jarmo. / Assessing safety of CAN-communications systems. SIAS 2010: The 6th International Conference on Safety of Industrial Automated Systems, Tampere, 14.-15.6.2010. Helsinki, 2010.
    @inproceedings{3a317f5df2a54f728e4fc876a6a5bf80,
    title = "Assessing safety of CAN-communications systems",
    abstract = "Controller Area Network (CAN) is a de-facto communications standard in many fields of machine automation. Such fields are example forestry machines and mining machines. In many cases the CAN-bus carries data that is safety relevant. However, the implementation of the CAN-bus does not often include a certified safety layer and is thus not characterised as a safety bus. The paper describes a procedure to assess non-certified CAN communications systems in regard to safety. The procedure is partly based on the message error model of the IEC 61784-3 standard for the functional safety of fieldbuses and partly on the validation methods defined in the Swedish P{\aa}lbus-project. The message error model consists, according to IEC 61784-3, of eight communication error types, corruption, unintended repetition, incorrect sequence, loss, unacceptable delay, insertion, masquerade and wrong addressing. Besides these, excessive transmission time jitter and inconsistency are additional error types, the latter being a special case of the eight error types above. Of these, corruption threat and unacceptable delay can be assessed quantitatively; for others qualitative analysis is adequate. A more precise assessment of corruption error compared to that of IEC 61784-3 is discussed in the paper.",
    keywords = "machines, control system, safety, analysis",
    author = "Jarmo Alanen",
    year = "2010",
    language = "English",
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    }

    Alanen, J 2010, Assessing safety of CAN-communications systems. in SIAS 2010: The 6th International Conference on Safety of Industrial Automated Systems, Tampere, 14.-15.6.2010. Helsinki, 6th International Conference on Safety of Industrial Automation Systems, SIAS 2010, Tampere, Finland, 14/06/10.

    Assessing safety of CAN-communications systems. / Alanen, Jarmo.

    SIAS 2010: The 6th International Conference on Safety of Industrial Automated Systems, Tampere, 14.-15.6.2010. Helsinki, 2010.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference article in proceedingsProfessional

    TY - GEN

    T1 - Assessing safety of CAN-communications systems

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    PY - 2010

    Y1 - 2010

    N2 - Controller Area Network (CAN) is a de-facto communications standard in many fields of machine automation. Such fields are example forestry machines and mining machines. In many cases the CAN-bus carries data that is safety relevant. However, the implementation of the CAN-bus does not often include a certified safety layer and is thus not characterised as a safety bus. The paper describes a procedure to assess non-certified CAN communications systems in regard to safety. The procedure is partly based on the message error model of the IEC 61784-3 standard for the functional safety of fieldbuses and partly on the validation methods defined in the Swedish Pålbus-project. The message error model consists, according to IEC 61784-3, of eight communication error types, corruption, unintended repetition, incorrect sequence, loss, unacceptable delay, insertion, masquerade and wrong addressing. Besides these, excessive transmission time jitter and inconsistency are additional error types, the latter being a special case of the eight error types above. Of these, corruption threat and unacceptable delay can be assessed quantitatively; for others qualitative analysis is adequate. A more precise assessment of corruption error compared to that of IEC 61784-3 is discussed in the paper.

    AB - Controller Area Network (CAN) is a de-facto communications standard in many fields of machine automation. Such fields are example forestry machines and mining machines. In many cases the CAN-bus carries data that is safety relevant. However, the implementation of the CAN-bus does not often include a certified safety layer and is thus not characterised as a safety bus. The paper describes a procedure to assess non-certified CAN communications systems in regard to safety. The procedure is partly based on the message error model of the IEC 61784-3 standard for the functional safety of fieldbuses and partly on the validation methods defined in the Swedish Pålbus-project. The message error model consists, according to IEC 61784-3, of eight communication error types, corruption, unintended repetition, incorrect sequence, loss, unacceptable delay, insertion, masquerade and wrong addressing. Besides these, excessive transmission time jitter and inconsistency are additional error types, the latter being a special case of the eight error types above. Of these, corruption threat and unacceptable delay can be assessed quantitatively; for others qualitative analysis is adequate. A more precise assessment of corruption error compared to that of IEC 61784-3 is discussed in the paper.

    KW - machines

    KW - control system

    KW - safety

    KW - analysis

    M3 - Conference article in proceedings

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    Alanen J. Assessing safety of CAN-communications systems. In SIAS 2010: The 6th International Conference on Safety of Industrial Automated Systems, Tampere, 14.-15.6.2010. Helsinki. 2010