Assessment of proliferation risk related to various fuel cycle scenarios in Finland

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference article in proceedingsScientific

Abstract

Some advanced fuel cycle scenarios have been previously calculated with the COSI6 code in order todetermine the potential impact of partitioning and transmutation (P&T) technologies on spent nuclear fuelmanagement in Finland. The focus has been on the transuranic inventories and decay heat production inthe final repository, the latter of which was assumed to be the restricting factor for the repository capacity.As an extension to these calculations the proliferation resistance considerations were added to the fuelcycle scenarios in the present study. The simulations were again performed with COSI6 and one of theobjectives was to investigate its applicability to proliferation resistance analysis.The calculated scenarios comprised a reference scenario and fuel cycle scenarios aiming at plutoniumand minor actinide incineration through P&T. The reference scenario comprised the currently operating fourlight-water reactors (LWR) with the combined capacity of ~2 800 MWe and the ones under construction or inpreparation, with additional ~4 400 MWe. The last of these units will be closed around 2090 and no newLWRs will be built thereafter. In the basic P&T scenario, some of the retired capacity is replaced withsodium-cooled fast reactors (SFR) and a gradual nuclear phase-out is assumed in 120 years.Proliferation resistance is a broad subject comprising several factors such as government policy,facility security and nuclear material properties. The present study concentrates on the technical featuresof the nuclear material streams and inventories at each time step. The main factors of interest with thisfocus are fissile materials, heat producers and even plutonium isotopes due to their role as majorspontaneous neutron source. These figures do not directly provide comparable information about therelated proliferation risk, so several methods have been developed to convert them into single comparablerisk values. One of them is the Charlton’s method that is based on the multi-attribute utility analysis. It wasutilised in the present study as far as applicable with COSI6.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationActinide and Fission Product Partitioning and Transmutation
PublisherOECD
Pages202-209
Publication statusPublished - 2015
MoE publication typeB3 Non-refereed article in conference proceedings
EventThirteenth Information Exchange Meeting - Seoul, Korea, Republic of
Duration: 23 Sep 201526 Sep 2015
Conference number: 13

Publication series

NameNuclear Science
PublisherOECDNEA
VolumeNEA/NSC/R(2015)2

Conference

ConferenceThirteenth Information Exchange Meeting
CountryKorea, Republic of
CitySeoul
Period23/09/1526/09/15

Fingerprint

Incineration
Fast reactors
Actinides
Neutron sources
Plutonium
Isotopes
Materials properties
Water
Hot Temperature

Keywords

  • nuclear fuel cycles
  • proliferation resistance
  • COSI6

Cite this

Juutilainen, P., & Häkkinen, S. (2015). Assessment of proliferation risk related to various fuel cycle scenarios in Finland. In Actinide and Fission Product Partitioning and Transmutation (pp. 202-209). OECD. Nuclear Science, Vol.. NEA/NSC/R(2015)2
Juutilainen, Pauli ; Häkkinen, Silja. / Assessment of proliferation risk related to various fuel cycle scenarios in Finland. Actinide and Fission Product Partitioning and Transmutation. OECD, 2015. pp. 202-209 (Nuclear Science, Vol. NEA/NSC/R(2015)2).
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Juutilainen, P & Häkkinen, S 2015, Assessment of proliferation risk related to various fuel cycle scenarios in Finland. in Actinide and Fission Product Partitioning and Transmutation. OECD, Nuclear Science, vol. NEA/NSC/R(2015)2, pp. 202-209, Thirteenth Information Exchange Meeting, Seoul, Korea, Republic of, 23/09/15.

Assessment of proliferation risk related to various fuel cycle scenarios in Finland. / Juutilainen, Pauli; Häkkinen, Silja.

Actinide and Fission Product Partitioning and Transmutation. OECD, 2015. p. 202-209 (Nuclear Science, Vol. NEA/NSC/R(2015)2).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference article in proceedingsScientific

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Juutilainen P, Häkkinen S. Assessment of proliferation risk related to various fuel cycle scenarios in Finland. In Actinide and Fission Product Partitioning and Transmutation. OECD. 2015. p. 202-209. (Nuclear Science, Vol. NEA/NSC/R(2015)2).