Game theoretic best-response dynamics for evacuees' exit selection

Harri Ehtamo, Simo Heliövaara, Timo Korhonen, Simo Hostikka

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

    29 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We present a model for evacuees' exit selection in emergency evacuations. The model is based on the game theoretic concept of best-response dynamics, where each player updates his strategy periodically by reacting optimally to other players' strategies. A fixed point of the system of all players' best-response functions defines a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game. In the model, the players are the evacuees and the strategies are the possible target exits. We present a mathematical formulation for the model and show that the game has a NE with pure strategies. We also analyze different iterative methods for finding the NE and derive an upper bound for the number of iterations needed to find the equilibrium. Numerical simulations are used to analyze the properties of the model.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)113-134
    Number of pages22
    JournalAdvances in Complex Systems
    Volume13
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2010
    MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

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    Dynamic response
    Iterative methods
    Computer simulation

    Keywords

    • evacuation simulation
    • best-response dynamics
    • exit selection
    • agent-based modeling
    • nash equilibria

    Cite this

    Ehtamo, Harri ; Heliövaara, Simo ; Korhonen, Timo ; Hostikka, Simo. / Game theoretic best-response dynamics for evacuees' exit selection. In: Advances in Complex Systems. 2010 ; Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 113-134.
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    abstract = "We present a model for evacuees' exit selection in emergency evacuations. The model is based on the game theoretic concept of best-response dynamics, where each player updates his strategy periodically by reacting optimally to other players' strategies. A fixed point of the system of all players' best-response functions defines a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game. In the model, the players are the evacuees and the strategies are the possible target exits. We present a mathematical formulation for the model and show that the game has a NE with pure strategies. We also analyze different iterative methods for finding the NE and derive an upper bound for the number of iterations needed to find the equilibrium. Numerical simulations are used to analyze the properties of the model.",
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    Game theoretic best-response dynamics for evacuees' exit selection. / Ehtamo, Harri; Heliövaara, Simo; Korhonen, Timo; Hostikka, Simo.

    In: Advances in Complex Systems, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2010, p. 113-134.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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