Model checking reveals design issues leading to spurious actuation of nuclear instrumentation and control systems

Antti Pakonen (Corresponding Author), Igor Buzhinsky, Kim Björkman

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

    19 Citations (Scopus)
    94 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    A spurious actuation of an industrial instrumentation and control (I&C) system is a failure mode where the system or its component inadvertently produces an operation without a justified reason to do so. Design issues leading to spurious failures are difficult to analyse, but pose a high risk for safety. Model checking is a formal verification method that can be used for exhaustive analysis of I&C systems. In this paper, we explain how formal properties that address spurious failures can be specified, and how model checking can then be used to verify I&C application logic designs based on vendor-specific function block diagrams. Based on over ten years of successful practical projects in the Finnish nuclear industry, we present 21 real-world design issues (representing 37% of all detected issues), each involving a systemic failure that could lead to spurious actuation of nuclear safety I&C. We then describe how random failures of the underlying hardware architecture—another cause for spurious actuation—can also be included in the models. With an experimental evaluation based on real-world nuclear industry models, we demonstrate that our method can be effectively used for the verification of single failure tolerance.
    Original languageEnglish
    Article number107237
    JournalReliability Engineering and System Safety
    Volume205
    Early online date1 Sept 2020
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Jan 2021
    MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

    Keywords

    • Model checking
    • I&C
    • Spurious failure
    • Model-based System Engineering

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