Modeling Evacuees' Exit Selection with Best Response Dynamics

Harri Ehtamo; Simo Heliövaara; Simo Hostikka; Timo Korhonen

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04504-2_27

Modeling Evacuees' Exit Selection with Best Response Dynamics

Harri Ehtamo, Simo Heliövaara, Simo Hostikka, Timo Korhonen

Helsinki University of Technology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference article in proceedings › Scientific › peer-review

Abstract

We present a model for occupants’ exit selection in emergency evacuations. The model is based on the game theoretic concept of best response dynamics, where each player updates his strategy periodically according to other players’ strategies. A fixed point of the system of all players’ best response functions defines a Nash equilibrium of the game. In the model the players are the occupants and the strategies are the possible target exits. We present a mathematical formulation for the model and analyze its properties with simple test simulations.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics 2008
Editors	Wolfram W.F. Klingsch, Christian Rogsch, Andreas Schadschneider, Michael Shreckenberg
Publisher	Springer
Chapter	2
Pages	309-319
Volume	Berlin
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-642-04504-2
ISBN (Print)	978-3-642-04503-5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04504-2_27
Publication status	Published - 2010
MoE publication type	A4 Article in a conference publication
Event	4th International Conference on Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics (PED 2008) - Wuppertal, Germany Duration: 27 Feb 2008 → 29 Feb 2008

Conference

Conference	4th International Conference on Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics (PED 2008)
Country/Territory	Germany
City	Wuppertal
Period	27/02/08 → 29/02/08

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10.1007/978-3-642-04504-2_27

Cite this

@inproceedings{b3599d9375c34f42834ef80bb7db03fc,

title = "Modeling Evacuees' Exit Selection with Best Response Dynamics",

abstract = "We present a model for occupants{\textquoteright} exit selection in emergency evacuations. The model is based on the game theoretic concept of best response dynamics, where each player updates his strategy periodically according to other players{\textquoteright} strategies. A fixed point of the system of all players{\textquoteright} best response functions defines a Nash equilibrium of the game. In the model the players are the occupants and the strategies are the possible target exits. We present a mathematical formulation for the model and analyze its properties with simple test simulations.",

author = "Harri Ehtamo and Simo Heli{\"o}vaara and Simo Hostikka and Timo Korhonen",

year = "2010",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-642-04504-2_27",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-3-642-04503-5",

volume = "Berlin",

pages = "309--319",

editor = "Klingsch, {Wolfram W.F.} and Christian Rogsch and Andreas Schadschneider and Michael Shreckenberg",

booktitle = "Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics 2008",

publisher = "Springer",

address = "Germany",

note = "4th International Conference on Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics (PED 2008) ; Conference date: 27-02-2008 Through 29-02-2008",

}

Ehtamo, H, Heliövaara, S, Hostikka, S & Korhonen, T 2010, Modeling Evacuees' Exit Selection with Best Response Dynamics. in WWF Klingsch, C Rogsch, A Schadschneider & M Shreckenberg (eds), Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics 2008 . vol. Berlin, Springer, pp. 309-319, 4th International Conference on Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics (PED 2008), Wuppertal, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany, 27/02/08. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04504-2_27

Modeling Evacuees' Exit Selection with Best Response Dynamics. / Ehtamo, Harri; Heliövaara, Simo; Hostikka, Simo et al.
Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics 2008 . ed. / Wolfram W.F. Klingsch; Christian Rogsch; Andreas Schadschneider; Michael Shreckenberg. Vol. Berlin Springer, 2010. p. 309-319.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference article in proceedings › Scientific › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Modeling Evacuees' Exit Selection with Best Response Dynamics

AU - Ehtamo, Harri

AU - Heliövaara, Simo

AU - Hostikka, Simo

AU - Korhonen, Timo

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - We present a model for occupants’ exit selection in emergency evacuations. The model is based on the game theoretic concept of best response dynamics, where each player updates his strategy periodically according to other players’ strategies. A fixed point of the system of all players’ best response functions defines a Nash equilibrium of the game. In the model the players are the occupants and the strategies are the possible target exits. We present a mathematical formulation for the model and analyze its properties with simple test simulations.

AB - We present a model for occupants’ exit selection in emergency evacuations. The model is based on the game theoretic concept of best response dynamics, where each player updates his strategy periodically according to other players’ strategies. A fixed point of the system of all players’ best response functions defines a Nash equilibrium of the game. In the model the players are the occupants and the strategies are the possible target exits. We present a mathematical formulation for the model and analyze its properties with simple test simulations.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-04504-2_27

DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-04504-2_27

M3 - Conference article in proceedings

SN - 978-3-642-04503-5

VL - Berlin

SP - 309

EP - 319

BT - Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics 2008

A2 - Klingsch, Wolfram W.F.

A2 - Rogsch, Christian

A2 - Schadschneider, Andreas

A2 - Shreckenberg, Michael

PB - Springer

T2 - 4th International Conference on Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics (PED 2008)

Y2 - 27 February 2008 through 29 February 2008

ER -

Modeling Evacuees' Exit Selection with Best Response Dynamics

Abstract

Conference

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