Abstract
Design/methodology/approach
A two-stage target-cost (2STC) arrangement has been
proposed as the solution. In this model the service
provider earns a bonus by suggesting a lower target cost
than the reference set at the time of the involvement of
the provider. The amount of bonus also impacts the cost
over-run risk transferred to the service provider to
avoid overly optimistic promises. The proposition
encompassed just the basic idea, and did not really delve
into actual model formulations and their functioning
under practical realities. Therefore, the required work
is presented here in the form of a conceptual, discursive
study focusing on relevant theories and empirical
findings from major investment projects.
Findings
The study produces a requirement framework for the 2STC
model to allow functioning models to be formulated and
tested. The framework incorporates numerous requirements,
constraints and a suggested path forward. For instance,
while the model may not be manipulatable, it must
incentivise the service provider to seek more
cost-effective project solutions, be feasible also from
the view of the project owner and adapt to various
project risk profiles and ranges of efficiency
improvements.
Research limitations/implications
The study suggests more concrete model formulations to be
provided under the guidance of the presented framework.
Originality/value
The 2STC model is a unique concept and no comparable
construct is known to exist. Besides the requirement
framework, the study also strengthens the foundation of
and need for the 2STC model by a thorough survey of its
theoretical linkages. Accordingly, the study presented in
this paper forms the second stage in the overall 2STC
development process focused on benefiting project owners
and the industry.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 123 - 146 |
Journal | International Journal of Managing Projects in Business |
Volume | 9 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2016 |
MoE publication type | A1 Journal article-refereed |
Keywords
- early contractor involvement
- incentive contracts
- price determination
- principal-agent theory
- relational contracting
- target cost