Probabilistic safety goals. Phase 2 status report

Jan-Erik Holmberg, Kim Björkman, Jukka Rossi, Michael Knochenhauer, Xuhong He, Anders Persson, Gustavsson Helena

    Research output: Book/ReportReport

    Abstract

    The second phase of the project, the outcome of which is described in this pro-ject report has mainly dealt with four issues: Consistency in the usage of safety goals, Criteria for assessment of results from PSA level 2, Overview of international safety goals and experiences from their use, Safety goals related to other man-made risks in society. Consistency in judgement over time has been perceived to be one of the main problems in the usage of safety goals. Safety goals defined in the 80ies were met in the beginning with PSA:s performed to the standards of that time, i.e., by PSA:s that were quite limited in scope and level of detail compared to today’s state of the art. This issue was investigated by performing a comparative review was performed of three generations of the same PSA, focusing on the impact from changes over time in component failure data, IE frequency, and modelling of the plant, including plant changes and changes in success criteria. It proved to be very time-consuming and in some cases next to impossible to correctly identify the basic causes for changes in PSA results. A multitude of different sub-causes turned out to combined and difficult to differentiate. Thus, rigorous book-keeping is needed in order to keep track of how and why PSA results change. This is es-pecially important in order to differentiate “real” differences due to plant changes and updated component and IE data from differences that are due to general PSA development (scope, level of detail, modelling issues).
    Original languageEnglish
    Number of pages46
    Publication statusPublished - 2008
    MoE publication typeD4 Published development or research report or study

    Publication series

    SeriesNKS Reports
    NumberNKS-172
    Volume172

    Fingerprint

    Safety

    Keywords

    • Safety Goals
    • PSA
    • Safety Targets
    • ALARP
    • Decision criteria
    • Risk informed decision making

    Cite this

    Holmberg, J-E., Björkman, K., Rossi, J., Knochenhauer, M., He, X., Persson, A., & Helena, G. (2008). Probabilistic safety goals. Phase 2 status report. NKS Reports, No. NKS-172, Vol.. 172
    Holmberg, Jan-Erik ; Björkman, Kim ; Rossi, Jukka ; Knochenhauer, Michael ; He, Xuhong ; Persson, Anders ; Helena, Gustavsson. / Probabilistic safety goals. Phase 2 status report. 2008. 46 p. (NKS Reports; No. NKS-172, Vol. 172).
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    author = "Jan-Erik Holmberg and Kim Bj{\"o}rkman and Jukka Rossi and Michael Knochenhauer and Xuhong He and Anders Persson and Gustavsson Helena",
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    Holmberg, J-E, Björkman, K, Rossi, J, Knochenhauer, M, He, X, Persson, A & Helena, G 2008, Probabilistic safety goals. Phase 2 status report. NKS Reports, no. NKS-172, vol. 172.

    Probabilistic safety goals. Phase 2 status report. / Holmberg, Jan-Erik; Björkman, Kim; Rossi, Jukka; Knochenhauer, Michael; He, Xuhong; Persson, Anders; Helena, Gustavsson.

    2008. 46 p. (NKS Reports; No. NKS-172, Vol. 172).

    Research output: Book/ReportReport

    TY - BOOK

    T1 - Probabilistic safety goals. Phase 2 status report

    AU - Holmberg, Jan-Erik

    AU - Björkman, Kim

    AU - Rossi, Jukka

    AU - Knochenhauer, Michael

    AU - He, Xuhong

    AU - Persson, Anders

    AU - Helena, Gustavsson

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    PY - 2008

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    N2 - The second phase of the project, the outcome of which is described in this pro-ject report has mainly dealt with four issues: Consistency in the usage of safety goals, Criteria for assessment of results from PSA level 2, Overview of international safety goals and experiences from their use, Safety goals related to other man-made risks in society. Consistency in judgement over time has been perceived to be one of the main problems in the usage of safety goals. Safety goals defined in the 80ies were met in the beginning with PSA:s performed to the standards of that time, i.e., by PSA:s that were quite limited in scope and level of detail compared to today’s state of the art. This issue was investigated by performing a comparative review was performed of three generations of the same PSA, focusing on the impact from changes over time in component failure data, IE frequency, and modelling of the plant, including plant changes and changes in success criteria. It proved to be very time-consuming and in some cases next to impossible to correctly identify the basic causes for changes in PSA results. A multitude of different sub-causes turned out to combined and difficult to differentiate. Thus, rigorous book-keeping is needed in order to keep track of how and why PSA results change. This is es-pecially important in order to differentiate “real” differences due to plant changes and updated component and IE data from differences that are due to general PSA development (scope, level of detail, modelling issues).

    AB - The second phase of the project, the outcome of which is described in this pro-ject report has mainly dealt with four issues: Consistency in the usage of safety goals, Criteria for assessment of results from PSA level 2, Overview of international safety goals and experiences from their use, Safety goals related to other man-made risks in society. Consistency in judgement over time has been perceived to be one of the main problems in the usage of safety goals. Safety goals defined in the 80ies were met in the beginning with PSA:s performed to the standards of that time, i.e., by PSA:s that were quite limited in scope and level of detail compared to today’s state of the art. This issue was investigated by performing a comparative review was performed of three generations of the same PSA, focusing on the impact from changes over time in component failure data, IE frequency, and modelling of the plant, including plant changes and changes in success criteria. It proved to be very time-consuming and in some cases next to impossible to correctly identify the basic causes for changes in PSA results. A multitude of different sub-causes turned out to combined and difficult to differentiate. Thus, rigorous book-keeping is needed in order to keep track of how and why PSA results change. This is es-pecially important in order to differentiate “real” differences due to plant changes and updated component and IE data from differences that are due to general PSA development (scope, level of detail, modelling issues).

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    KW - PSA

    KW - Safety Targets

    KW - ALARP

    KW - Decision criteria

    KW - Risk informed decision making

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    BT - Probabilistic safety goals. Phase 2 status report

    ER -

    Holmberg J-E, Björkman K, Rossi J, Knochenhauer M, He X, Persson A et al. Probabilistic safety goals. Phase 2 status report. 2008. 46 p. (NKS Reports; No. NKS-172, Vol. 172).