Quantification of reactor protection system software reliability based on indirect and direct evidence

Ola Bäckström (Corresponding author), Jan-Erik Holmberg, Mariana Jockenhövel-Barttfeld, Markus Porthin, Andre Taurines

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference article in proceedingsProfessional

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system in the context of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for a nuclear power plant. The emphasis of the method is on the quantification of the failure probability of an application software module, which can lead to the functional failure modes: failure to actuate on demand a specific instrumentation and control (I&C) function or spurious actuation of a specific I&C function. The quantification is based on two main metrics, complexity of the application software and the degree of verification and validation of the software. The relevance of common cause failures and an analysis of the impact of fatal and non-fatal failures on the system will be covered by the discussion. Collection of operational data and challenges to use it for software reliability quantification will also be discussed. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures that are usually ignored in current PSAs.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPSAM12
Subtitle of host publicationProbabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, June 22-27, 2014
Number of pages11
Publication statusPublished - 2014
MoE publication typeD3 Professional conference proceedings
Event12th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, PSAM 2014 - Honolulu, United States
Duration: 22 Jun 201427 Jun 2014

Conference

Conference12th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, PSAM 2014
Abbreviated titlePSAM 2014
CountryUnited States
CityHonolulu
Period22/06/1427/06/14

Fingerprint

Software reliability
Application programs
Failure modes
Nuclear power plants

Keywords

  • PSA
  • software reliability
  • operational history data

Cite this

Bäckström, O., Holmberg, J-E., Jockenhövel-Barttfeld, M., Porthin, M., & Taurines, A. (2014). Quantification of reactor protection system software reliability based on indirect and direct evidence. In PSAM12: Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, June 22-27, 2014 [458]
Bäckström, Ola ; Holmberg, Jan-Erik ; Jockenhövel-Barttfeld, Mariana ; Porthin, Markus ; Taurines, Andre. / Quantification of reactor protection system software reliability based on indirect and direct evidence. PSAM12: Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, June 22-27, 2014. 2014.
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Bäckström, O, Holmberg, J-E, Jockenhövel-Barttfeld, M, Porthin, M & Taurines, A 2014, Quantification of reactor protection system software reliability based on indirect and direct evidence. in PSAM12: Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, June 22-27, 2014., 458, 12th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, PSAM 2014, Honolulu, United States, 22/06/14.

Quantification of reactor protection system software reliability based on indirect and direct evidence. / Bäckström, Ola (Corresponding author); Holmberg, Jan-Erik; Jockenhövel-Barttfeld, Mariana; Porthin, Markus; Taurines, Andre.

PSAM12: Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, June 22-27, 2014. 2014. 458.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference article in proceedingsProfessional

TY - GEN

T1 - Quantification of reactor protection system software reliability based on indirect and direct evidence

AU - Bäckström, Ola

AU - Holmberg, Jan-Erik

AU - Jockenhövel-Barttfeld, Mariana

AU - Porthin, Markus

AU - Taurines, Andre

N1 - CA2: BA2115 Project code: 85366

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N2 - This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system in the context of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for a nuclear power plant. The emphasis of the method is on the quantification of the failure probability of an application software module, which can lead to the functional failure modes: failure to actuate on demand a specific instrumentation and control (I&C) function or spurious actuation of a specific I&C function. The quantification is based on two main metrics, complexity of the application software and the degree of verification and validation of the software. The relevance of common cause failures and an analysis of the impact of fatal and non-fatal failures on the system will be covered by the discussion. Collection of operational data and challenges to use it for software reliability quantification will also be discussed. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures that are usually ignored in current PSAs.

AB - This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system in the context of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for a nuclear power plant. The emphasis of the method is on the quantification of the failure probability of an application software module, which can lead to the functional failure modes: failure to actuate on demand a specific instrumentation and control (I&C) function or spurious actuation of a specific I&C function. The quantification is based on two main metrics, complexity of the application software and the degree of verification and validation of the software. The relevance of common cause failures and an analysis of the impact of fatal and non-fatal failures on the system will be covered by the discussion. Collection of operational data and challenges to use it for software reliability quantification will also be discussed. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures that are usually ignored in current PSAs.

KW - PSA

KW - software reliability

KW - operational history data

M3 - Conference article in proceedings

BT - PSAM12

ER -

Bäckström O, Holmberg J-E, Jockenhövel-Barttfeld M, Porthin M, Taurines A. Quantification of reactor protection system software reliability based on indirect and direct evidence. In PSAM12: Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, June 22-27, 2014. 2014. 458