Quantification of reactor protection system software reliability based on indirect and direct evidence

Ola Bäckström; Jan-Erik Holmberg; Mariana Jockenhövel-Barttfeld; Markus Porthin; Andre Taurines

Quantification of reactor protection system software reliability based on indirect and direct evidence

Ola Bäckström (Corresponding author), Jan-Erik Holmberg, Mariana Jockenhövel-Barttfeld, Markus Porthin, Andre Taurines

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference article in proceedings › Professional

Abstract

This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system in the context of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for a nuclear power plant. The emphasis of the method is on the quantification of the failure probability of an application software module, which can lead to the functional failure modes: failure to actuate on demand a specific instrumentation and control (I&C) function or spurious actuation of a specific I&C function. The quantification is based on two main metrics, complexity of the application software and the degree of verification and validation of the software. The relevance of common cause failures and an analysis of the impact of fatal and non-fatal failures on the system will be covered by the discussion. Collection of operational data and challenges to use it for software reliability quantification will also be discussed. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures that are usually ignored in current PSAs.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	PSAM12
Subtitle of host publication	Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, June 22-27, 2014
Number of pages	11
Publication status	Published - 2014
MoE publication type	D3 Professional conference proceedings
Event	12th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, PSAM 2014 - Honolulu, United States Duration: 22 Jun 2014 → 27 Jun 2014

Conference

Conference	12th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, PSAM 2014
Abbreviated title	PSAM 2014
Country	United States
City	Honolulu
Period	22/06/14 → 27/06/14

Keywords

PSA
software reliability
operational history data

Access to Document

http://psam12.org/proceedings/paper/paper_458_1.pdf

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Cite this

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title = "Quantification of reactor protection system software reliability based on indirect and direct evidence",

abstract = "This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system in the context of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for a nuclear power plant. The emphasis of the method is on the quantification of the failure probability of an application software module, which can lead to the functional failure modes: failure to actuate on demand a specific instrumentation and control (I&C) function or spurious actuation of a specific I&C function. The quantification is based on two main metrics, complexity of the application software and the degree of verification and validation of the software. The relevance of common cause failures and an analysis of the impact of fatal and non-fatal failures on the system will be covered by the discussion. Collection of operational data and challenges to use it for software reliability quantification will also be discussed. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures that are usually ignored in current PSAs.",

keywords = "PSA, software reliability, operational history data",

author = "Ola B{\"a}ckstr{\"o}m and Jan-Erik Holmberg and Mariana Jockenh{\"o}vel-Barttfeld and Markus Porthin and Andre Taurines",

note = "CA2: BA2115 Project code: 85366; 12th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, PSAM 2014, PSAM 2014 ; Conference date: 22-06-2014 Through 27-06-2014",

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Bäckström, O, Holmberg, J-E, Jockenhövel-Barttfeld, M, Porthin, M & Taurines, A 2014, Quantification of reactor protection system software reliability based on indirect and direct evidence. in PSAM12: Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, June 22-27, 2014., 458, 12th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, PSAM 2014, Honolulu, United States, 22/06/14. <http://psam12.org/proceedings/paper/paper_458_1.pdf>

Quantification of reactor protection system software reliability based on indirect and direct evidence. / Bäckström, Ola (Corresponding author); Holmberg, Jan-Erik; Jockenhövel-Barttfeld, Mariana; Porthin, Markus; Taurines, Andre.

PSAM12: Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, June 22-27, 2014. 2014. 458.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference article in proceedings › Professional

TY - GEN

T1 - Quantification of reactor protection system software reliability based on indirect and direct evidence

AU - Bäckström, Ola

AU - Holmberg, Jan-Erik

AU - Jockenhövel-Barttfeld, Mariana

AU - Porthin, Markus

AU - Taurines, Andre

N1 - CA2: BA2115 Project code: 85366

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system in the context of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for a nuclear power plant. The emphasis of the method is on the quantification of the failure probability of an application software module, which can lead to the functional failure modes: failure to actuate on demand a specific instrumentation and control (I&C) function or spurious actuation of a specific I&C function. The quantification is based on two main metrics, complexity of the application software and the degree of verification and validation of the software. The relevance of common cause failures and an analysis of the impact of fatal and non-fatal failures on the system will be covered by the discussion. Collection of operational data and challenges to use it for software reliability quantification will also be discussed. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures that are usually ignored in current PSAs.

AB - This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system in the context of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for a nuclear power plant. The emphasis of the method is on the quantification of the failure probability of an application software module, which can lead to the functional failure modes: failure to actuate on demand a specific instrumentation and control (I&C) function or spurious actuation of a specific I&C function. The quantification is based on two main metrics, complexity of the application software and the degree of verification and validation of the software. The relevance of common cause failures and an analysis of the impact of fatal and non-fatal failures on the system will be covered by the discussion. Collection of operational data and challenges to use it for software reliability quantification will also be discussed. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures that are usually ignored in current PSAs.

KW - PSA

KW - software reliability

KW - operational history data

M3 - Conference article in proceedings

BT - PSAM12

T2 - 12th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, PSAM 2014

Y2 - 22 June 2014 through 27 June 2014

ER -