Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | PSAM12 |
| Subtitle of host publication | Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, June 22-27, 2014 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
| MoE publication type | D3 Professional conference proceedings |
| Event | 12th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, PSAM 2014 - Honolulu, United States Duration: 22 Jun 2014 → 27 Jun 2014 |
Conference
| Conference | 12th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, PSAM 2014 |
|---|---|
| Abbreviated title | PSAM 2014 |
| Country | United States |
| City | Honolulu |
| Period | 22/06/14 → 27/06/14 |
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Keywords
- PSA
- software reliability
- operational history data
Cite this
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Quantification of reactor protection system software reliability based on indirect and direct evidence. / Bäckström, Ola (Corresponding author); Holmberg, Jan-Erik; Jockenhövel-Barttfeld, Mariana; Porthin, Markus; Taurines, Andre.
PSAM12: Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, June 22-27, 2014. 2014. 458.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference article in proceedings › Professional
TY - GEN
T1 - Quantification of reactor protection system software reliability based on indirect and direct evidence
AU - Bäckström, Ola
AU - Holmberg, Jan-Erik
AU - Jockenhövel-Barttfeld, Mariana
AU - Porthin, Markus
AU - Taurines, Andre
N1 - CA2: BA2115 Project code: 85366
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system in the context of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for a nuclear power plant. The emphasis of the method is on the quantification of the failure probability of an application software module, which can lead to the functional failure modes: failure to actuate on demand a specific instrumentation and control (I&C) function or spurious actuation of a specific I&C function. The quantification is based on two main metrics, complexity of the application software and the degree of verification and validation of the software. The relevance of common cause failures and an analysis of the impact of fatal and non-fatal failures on the system will be covered by the discussion. Collection of operational data and challenges to use it for software reliability quantification will also be discussed. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures that are usually ignored in current PSAs.
AB - This paper presents a method for the quantification of software failures in a reactor protection system in the context of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for a nuclear power plant. The emphasis of the method is on the quantification of the failure probability of an application software module, which can lead to the functional failure modes: failure to actuate on demand a specific instrumentation and control (I&C) function or spurious actuation of a specific I&C function. The quantification is based on two main metrics, complexity of the application software and the degree of verification and validation of the software. The relevance of common cause failures and an analysis of the impact of fatal and non-fatal failures on the system will be covered by the discussion. Collection of operational data and challenges to use it for software reliability quantification will also be discussed. The outlined quantification method offers a practical and justifiable approach to account for software failures that are usually ignored in current PSAs.
KW - PSA
KW - software reliability
KW - operational history data
M3 - Conference article in proceedings
BT - PSAM12
ER -