Abstract
This paper presents a method for the quantification of
software failures in a reactor protection system in the
context of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for a
nuclear power plant. The emphasis of the method is on the
quantification of the failure probability of an
application software module, which can lead to the
functional failure modes: failure to actuate on demand a
specific instrumentation and control (I&C) function or
spurious actuation of a specific I&C function. The
quantification is based on two main metrics, complexity
of the application software and the degree of
verification and validation of the software. The
relevance of common cause failures and an analysis of the
impact of fatal and non-fatal failures on the system will
be covered by the discussion. Collection of operational
data and challenges to use it for software reliability
quantification will also be discussed. The outlined
quantification method offers a practical and justifiable
approach to account for software failures that are
usually ignored in current PSAs.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | PSAM12 |
| Subtitle of host publication | Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management |
| Editors | Curtis Lee Smith, Todd Paulos |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
| MoE publication type | A4 Article in a conference publication |
| Event | 12th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, PSAM 2014 - Honolulu, United States Duration: 22 Jun 2014 → 27 Jun 2014 |
Conference
| Conference | 12th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, PSAM 2014 |
|---|---|
| Abbreviated title | PSAM 2014 |
| Country/Territory | United States |
| City | Honolulu |
| Period | 22/06/14 → 27/06/14 |
Keywords
- PSA
- software reliability
- operational history data