Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 3-15 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Reliability Engineering and System Safety |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1996 |
| MoE publication type | A1 Journal article-refereed |
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Risk follow-up by probabilistic safety assessment : Experience from a Finnish pilot study. / Holmberg, Jan.
In: Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1996, p. 3-15.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Risk follow-up by probabilistic safety assessment
T2 - Experience from a Finnish pilot study
AU - Holmberg, Jan
N1 - Project code: A6SU00001
PY - 1996
Y1 - 1996
N2 - Risk follow-up by probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) provides a systematic method to analyze incidents. Events can be evaluated from the safety point of view to get feedback from operating experience, for the identification of risk contributors and for the verification of PSA models. This paper is concerned with the risk follow-up methodology, which is based on a marked point process framework. This framework provides a theoretically rigorous method for retrospective risk evaluations. Basic concepts for the modelling and an evaluation of the operating history by PSA are presented, and a Finnish pilot study on risk follow-up is summarized. We recommend the ‘total memory approach’ for the assessment of the unavailability of the standby safety systems. According to our experience, accurate evaluations with time-dependent component models are not necessarily needed but simplifying approximations can be used. The modelling of common cause failures remains a problem in practice, however, because there are not enough data to distinguish them properly.
AB - Risk follow-up by probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) provides a systematic method to analyze incidents. Events can be evaluated from the safety point of view to get feedback from operating experience, for the identification of risk contributors and for the verification of PSA models. This paper is concerned with the risk follow-up methodology, which is based on a marked point process framework. This framework provides a theoretically rigorous method for retrospective risk evaluations. Basic concepts for the modelling and an evaluation of the operating history by PSA are presented, and a Finnish pilot study on risk follow-up is summarized. We recommend the ‘total memory approach’ for the assessment of the unavailability of the standby safety systems. According to our experience, accurate evaluations with time-dependent component models are not necessarily needed but simplifying approximations can be used. The modelling of common cause failures remains a problem in practice, however, because there are not enough data to distinguish them properly.
U2 - 10.1016/0951-8320(96)00029-4
DO - 10.1016/0951-8320(96)00029-4
M3 - Article
VL - 53
SP - 3
EP - 15
JO - Reliability Engineering and System Safety
JF - Reliability Engineering and System Safety
SN - 0951-8320
IS - 1
ER -