Strategic determinants not to settle patent litigation: replication and extension of Somaya (2003)

Tomomi Kito; Yuki Murata; Junichi Yamanoi; Ravi Madhavan

Strategic determinants not to settle patent litigation: replication and extension of Somaya (2003)

Tomomi Kito, Yuki Murata, Junichi Yamanoi, Ravi Madhavan

Not published at VTT

Research output: Contribution to conference › Conference Abstract › Scientific › peer-review

Abstract

When companies engage in patent litigation, the decision to settle or not represents an intriguing intersection of competitive strategy and intellectual property (IP) strategy. Somaya (2003) modeled such decisions as the result of two influences: the use of patents as isolating mechanisms and their defensive role in obtaining access to external technologies through mutual hold-up. Despite the compelling theory, however, the original study obtained mixed results. Utilizing a new dataset with coverage of patent litigation outcomes, we attempted a re-test of Somaya's (2003) results and obtained the same pattern of mixed results. We advance possible explanations and outline extension steps to further refine a theory of decisions not to settle.

Original language	English
Publication status	Published - 2022
MoE publication type	Not Eligible
Event	Strategic Management Society: 42nd Annual Conference - London, United Kingdom Duration: 17 Sept 2022 → 20 Sept 2022 Conference number: 42 https://www.strategicmanagement.net/london/overview/overview

Conference

Conference	Strategic Management Society
Abbreviated title	SMS
Country/Territory	United Kingdom
City	London
Period	17/09/22 → 20/09/22
Internet address	https://www.strategicmanagement.net/london/overview/overview

Keywords

patent analysis
patent litigation
competitive dynamics
IP strategies

Cite this

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title = "Strategic determinants not to settle patent litigation: replication and extension of Somaya (2003)",

abstract = "When companies engage in patent litigation, the decision to settle or not represents an intriguing intersection of competitive strategy and intellectual property (IP) strategy. Somaya (2003) modeled such decisions as the result of two influences: the use of patents as isolating mechanisms and their defensive role in obtaining access to external technologies through mutual hold-up. Despite the compelling theory, however, the original study obtained mixed results. Utilizing a new dataset with coverage of patent litigation outcomes, we attempted a re-test of Somaya's (2003) results and obtained the same pattern of mixed results. We advance possible explanations and outline extension steps to further refine a theory of decisions not to settle.",

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TY - CONF

T1 - Strategic determinants not to settle patent litigation: replication and extension of Somaya (2003)

AU - Kito, Tomomi

AU - Murata, Yuki

AU - Yamanoi, Junichi

AU - Madhavan, Ravi

N1 - Conference code: 42

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - When companies engage in patent litigation, the decision to settle or not represents an intriguing intersection of competitive strategy and intellectual property (IP) strategy. Somaya (2003) modeled such decisions as the result of two influences: the use of patents as isolating mechanisms and their defensive role in obtaining access to external technologies through mutual hold-up. Despite the compelling theory, however, the original study obtained mixed results. Utilizing a new dataset with coverage of patent litigation outcomes, we attempted a re-test of Somaya's (2003) results and obtained the same pattern of mixed results. We advance possible explanations and outline extension steps to further refine a theory of decisions not to settle.

AB - When companies engage in patent litigation, the decision to settle or not represents an intriguing intersection of competitive strategy and intellectual property (IP) strategy. Somaya (2003) modeled such decisions as the result of two influences: the use of patents as isolating mechanisms and their defensive role in obtaining access to external technologies through mutual hold-up. Despite the compelling theory, however, the original study obtained mixed results. Utilizing a new dataset with coverage of patent litigation outcomes, we attempted a re-test of Somaya's (2003) results and obtained the same pattern of mixed results. We advance possible explanations and outline extension steps to further refine a theory of decisions not to settle.

KW - patent analysis

KW - patent litigation

KW - competitive dynamics

KW - IP strategies

M3 - Conference Abstract

T2 - Strategic Management Society

Y2 - 17 September 2022 through 20 September 2022

ER -

Strategic determinants not to settle patent litigation: replication and extension of Somaya (2003)

Abstract

Conference

Keywords

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Cite this